Last 301 - Snort a Line, Kill a Colombian

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Hello all,

Here it is, my case study on Plan Colombia. If anyone is interested please enter and read the whole paper.

Saludos,

RuizSKBO


Plan Colombia and human rights implications
Case Study

This case study on “Plan Colombia” discusses the implications that this policy against drug trafficking has had in terms of Human Rights violations in Colombia, and the collateral implications that this policy entails. Presented first will be historical background information on Plan Colombia, followed by a discussion of the relationship between Plan Colombia and human rights issues. In order to do so, there will be an examination of the forced displacement problem in Colombia, the political implications of supporting such a plan for the United States and Colombian governments, and the environmental issues linked with the fumigation of coca plantations put forward by Plan Colombia. This approach to the case study will also present a critique, commentary and analysis of the sources used in this study.


1. History of Plan Colombia:

To start talking about Plan Colombia and its implications for Colombian society today, one has to first understand the reasons that lead to the development of this plan in the first place. To do so, one has to understand the problem of illegal drug trade and production in Colombia since it first started, especially cocaine trade.

Illegal production and export of narcotics in Colombia traces back to the 1970’s, when the first marihuana plantations stated emerging and as such mafia organizations started to develop around this business. But it was not until the 1980’s that the real implications of the problem became apparent, when these drug cartels (especially in Cali and Medellin), became a very strong force after entering the highly lucrative cocaine trade business. They even became such a strong political and economic force, that Pablo Escobar at one stage even offered to pay of Colombia’s foreign debt with money made by the cocaine trade alone (Simons 61). It was at this point in time when the drug cartels, in order to secure their rural coca plantations from the presence of radical left – wing guerrilla insurgents, started to hire mercenaries that would later on serve as a private military force and a paramilitary movement named “Muerte a Secuestradores” (MAS) was founded in 1981 with support of the drug lords (Simons 55) (Simons 64). Fidel and Carlos Castaño, funding members of MAS, later on were going to be involved with other paramilitary organizations, the most important being the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUC (Livingstone 54).

With the debacle of the classic drug cartels in Cali and Medellin in the early 1990’s, leading to Pablo Escobar’s assassination by the Colombian army on December 2nd 1993 (Simons 85), the drug trade business suddenly saw itself under no body’s control. Politicians in Washington and Bogotá thought that with Escobar’s death, and with the elimination of the two major drug cartels in Cali and Medellin, the war on drugs was won. But they where wrong. Quickly enough, the now strong paramilitaries that where serving the interests of both the Colombian private sector and the illegal drug cartels from the attacks of guerrilla forces, took control of most of the coca cultivated lands in the country where they had military presence. Carlos Castaño effectively founded the AUC and the cocaine business continued its path, but this time without any distinctive mafia or recognizable organization in charge. The AUC continued to bring support and protection in the rural areas where they had military presence and the conflict escalated alarmingly. Confrontations between Guerrillas (FARC and ELN), paramilitaries and government forces increased to the point where in 1998 a total of 113 civilian massacres where attributed to AUC forces, 46 to Guerrilla fighters and 9 to the military (Livingstone, 34).

This shift in the way the conflict was evolving and becoming alarmingly bloody implied a change in government policies regarding the never-ending war on drugs and the Colombian civil conflict. With the escalation of violence in the rural areas, the government of Andres Pastrana put forward the most aggressive initiative ever made by a Colombian government in the fight against drugs (Livingstone, 123). Plan Colombia, as it was originally designed in 1999 by Pastrana, was a clear attempt to fundraise resources in order to finally achieving peace in Colombia (Livingstone, 124) Nevertheless, when the plan was presented to the Clinton administration in Washington, the document was substantially changed in its contents and scope. It shifted from a primarily social aid plan based on neo-liberal economic policies that would theoretically ensure sustained and equal development opportunities for Colombian coca-leaf growers, into a security and militarist approach to solving the civil conflict in Colombia. (Stokes, 92). Eventually Bogotá ceded to pressures from the United States and ended opting for Washington’s warlike approach. In this way Plan Colombia was born: it morphed from being a peace seeking plan based on a rhetoric attempting to eliminate huge social disparities, into a plan based upon drug traffic elimination and military strengthening policies (Stokes, 93).
Grace Livingstone, in her book titled “Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War” makes a very good point in stating the difference between the approach initially put forward by Pastrana’s government and what would later be the final version of the plan. She even affirms, “the US input was so extensive that the first draft of Plan Colombia was written in English, not Spanish” (Livingstone, 123). Her approach seems unbiased, presenting every side involved in the conflict as equally responsible for rights violations in so far what the different actors are to be held accountable for.

Doug Stokes goes one step further in stating that the United States’ version of Plan Colombia is a militaristic approach to resolve the conflict and says that the plan drawn by Washington, with its inherent militant approach, has encouraged human right violations that could be directly attributed to paramilitary organizations, and thus indirectly to the Colombian government (Stokes, 97). He implies that a cooperation pattern exists between paramilitary forces and the Colombian government. As true as this claim might be, it cannot be overstated and imply that they work hand by hand all the time. His approach seems more an attempt to legitimize left wing Guerrillas in their fight for social justice. But where his argument falls flat is when he fails to look closely enough at the human rights violations made by guerrilla movements over the years, which in part can hardly be seen as a struggle for the people any longer. Human rights violations in Colombia cannot be solely attributed to paramilitary or government forces; left wing guerrillas have also been accountable for a number of murders and kidnappings and it would be irresponsible to claim otherwise.


2. Plan Colombia and Human Rights:

With the US intervention in the drawing of Plan Colombia, the initial social agenda advocated by Pastrana was almost completely undermined. This premise set the first stone for disastrous consequences with regards to human rights abuses in Colombia, especially if you take into consideration the links that exist between the military and the paramilitary forces. As Ted Gallen puts it in his book, “Human Rights advocates (…) worried that Washington was crawling into bed with some of the worst abusers of human rights in the Western Hemisphere” (Gallen 72). He is referring to the Colombian military. To further emphasize this point, a quote by Geoff Simons is necessary:

On August 1999 the United Nations rebuked Colombia over yet another massacre, this one costing 36 lives; and on the following day the columnist Jonathan Power, writing in the Miami Herald, commented that the United States could go to war in Colombia ‘on the wrong side’.
(Simmons, 229)

This shows then that the approach taken by the United States was indeed a recipe for disaster, as it turned out to be. With 75% of the funds delivered to Colombia destined for military buildup and their alleged connections with the paramilitaries, Colombia would fall further into chaos and violence (Stokes, 93).


The Leahy Law:

Taking the formers premise into account (basically military and paramilitary cooperation), and that it holds true, it has to be noted that there is an inherent contradiction in the way US policies have been put forward in Colombia with regards to Plan Colombia. The United States endorses the so called “Leahy Law”, which basically comprehends the inability of the US to support any military effort with governments involved in Human Right violations. Stokes renders the implementation of such law as useless, because of its actual flaws when it comes to implementing it in the real world, because according to him in has too many loopholes where the interpretation of this legislation could be manipulated in order to justify certain actions (Stokes, 97). This has certainly been the case in Colombia, where the people in Washington have neglected military and paramilitary connections and have nevertheless given the green light for a militarist Plan Colombia.


Dirty War in Barrancabermeja:

Barrancabermeja is an important oil port in the north part of Colombia where a dirty war against trade unionist can be seen. Military and paramilitary cooperation is evident here, where the government’s agenda clearly shows a pattern seeking the eradication of anything inherently left wing in nature. Of course, this is in the best interest of the Colombian government, for it would undermine any guerrilla social activity and interaction with the population (Livingstone, 19 - 22). So therefore it has been reported that the AUC have been allowed “social cleansing” privileges in the region, where the government allegedly turns a blind eye with regards to disappearances performed by the paramilitaries. The Barrancabermeja example shows the relation that exists between the implementation of this dirty war and the economic interests of certain groups, most notably the United States and the Colombian entrepreneurial elite. According to Stokes, there is a clear economic agenda that justifies US backup and financing of the Colombian military. Therefore the US and Colombian government turn a blind eye towards AUC actions, even though it is clear that this organization is responsible for the majority of the human rights violations, especially massacres and selective assassinations (Livingstone, 12).


Humanitarian Crisis in Putumayo:

The implementation of Plan Colombia signified a total neglect of the social aspects involved with a buildup of the Colombian military infrastructure. A complete lack of social policies in Plan Colombia that would help mitigate and reduce social inequalities give the guerrillas yet another reason to exist and continue with their fight. Although their own rhetoric and morals are as of today corrupted and they no longer stand a fight in favor of the Colombian people, this kind of approach represented in Plan Colombia gives them the arguments necessary to retain support (even though very small and marginalized) in some of the Western Liberal Democracies (BBC News). If the social problems in Colombia where to be addressed accordingly by Plan Colombia, the arguments legitimizing the existence of FARC for example, would no longer hold true.

To further deepen this case study into the aspects of social injustices inflicted by Plan Colombia, environmental and social issues associated with the fumigation of illegal crops have to be considered. Since current Plan Colombia policies rely heavily on the eradication of coca-leaf plantations, the Putumayo region (historically known to be the home of some of the largest coca plantations) is the best example to illustrate the social crisis that Plan Colombia unfolds. Basically, under Plan Colombia policies, there is a complete lack of care towards environmental protection, or the well being of the local civil population. The plan implies fundamental rights abuses, namely by causing the forced displacement of civil populations due to the civil conflict between FARC and the military and by poisoning soils and water supplies with chemicals associated with the fumigation process. Most of the region has seen large numbers of its population emigrate to other places, mainly urban areas both within Colombia and to neighboring countries. The number of Colombians crossing the borders into Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama was estimate at about 37.000 in 2001, with Ecuador being the largest recipient of refugees from the Putumayo region (Ahumada, Moreno & Sanchez, 58). This exodus of people aggravates the humanitarian crisis and seriously questions Plan Colombia’s commitment to ending social injustices in the country. Efforts in this respect have been almost non-existent.


Recent developments:

As of November 18, 2006, a scandal involving Colombian congressmen and links to paramilitary organizations has hit the newswires. There have been accusations that certain congressmen, politically aligned with Colombian president Alvaro Uribe Velez, have had connections with paramilitary organizations in the past (El Tiempo). Plan Colombia started as a militarist policy under Andres Pastrana’s government, and it has continued up to this date throughout Alvaro Uribe’s mandate, elected president in 2002. Colombia is now seeing the unfolding of a political crisis where congressmen close to Uribe are being accused of having ties with the former paramilitaries. This eventuality gives strength to the theory that the United States “went to war in Colombia ‘on the wrong side’” (Simons, 229) and that the Leahy Law has been completely ignored. This implies that the United States are knowingly allowing for human rights abuses in Colombia through Plan Colombia, because of clear links between the Colombian military and the paramilitaries, seen most crudely in the town of Barrancabermeja.

Some scholars argue that the only way for Colombia to end its humanitarian crisis is trough legalizing drugs, or at least stepping into decriminalizing their use: with the elimination of a prohibitionist policy towards the drug problem, the need for strategies such as Plan Colombia (along with all of its inherent human rights violations implications) would be gone. As Gallen accurately puts it:

The only realistic way out of this policy morass is to adopt a regime of drug legalization. And contrary to the alarmists in the prohibitionist camp, that option is not a venture into terra incognita, replete with unimaginable horrors. Although the fact is largely forgotten, now-illicit drugs were once legal in America. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were virtually no restrictions on opiates, cocaine or marijuana.
(Gallen, 229)


Bliliography:

Ahumada Beltran, Consuelo, Alvaro Moreno Duran & Javier Sanchez Segura. El desplazamiento forzado de colombianos hacia Ecuador en el contexto del Plan Colombia Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Centro Editorial Javeriano, 2004

Carpenter, Ted Galen. Bad neighbor policy : Washington's futile war on drugs in Latin America. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2003

"Danish T-Shirts ‘to fund rebels’." BBC News. 20 January 2006, Online Edition. Retrieved 20 November 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4632578.stm

"El más difícil momento político atraviesa el gobierno de Álvaro Uribe" El Tiempo. 18 November 2006, Online Edition. Retrieved 20 November 2006. http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/2006-11-20/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-3331690.html


Livingstone, Grace. Inside Colombia : drugs, democracy, and war. London : Latin America Bureau, 2003

Simons, G. L. (Geoffrey Leslie). Colombia : a brutal history. London : Saqi, 2004

Stokes, Doug. Americas Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. London ; New York : Zed Books : Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillian, 2005